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Protecting the future well: access to preconception genetic
screening and testing and the right not to use it
Isabel Ann Karpin
Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
In this article, I assess the ethical and legal implications for a
progressive and inclusive approach towards people with disability,
of providing publicly funded and universal access to carrier
testing and expanded carrier testing. In answering this question
I focus on two main concerns namely whether such access
(1) involves a neoliberal individualisation of risk and responsibility
away from the State and (2) might impinge on the reproductive
and other rights of people with disability. With respect to this last
question I ask specifically is it possible to provide whole-population
preconception genetic carrier screening while legally guaranteeing
the reproductive rights to conceive of prospective parents, both






A ‘normal’ genetic profile is determined as much by the social as the scientific context and
can entrench existing assumptions about what it is to be healthy. Medical explanations of
disease, for example, are inflected by gendered and raced assumptions that layer over or
intersect with already contested accounts of what it is to be a person with disability. Gen-
etic carrier screening is a form of genetic testing that enables a person to ascertain their
risk of having a child with certain genetic conditions prior to conception. Expanded carrier
testing is a new form of this technology that allows a person to check for hundreds of poss-
ible genetic mutations simultaneously, without incurring significantly greater cost. How-
ever, the kinds of genetic mutations that might make up the category of the normatively
undesirable and be included in such tests are highly contested.
The national health care system in Australia is based on the broad principle of equal
access to health services for all and the universal health cover system, Medicare, was intro-
duced in 1984 to provide free or subsidised treatment by health professionals in certain
specified areas.1 More recently, the National Healthcare Agreement 2015 formed between
© 2016 Griffith University
CONTACT Isabel Ann Karpin isabel.karpin@uts.edu.au
1Medicare usually covers: (i)“free or subsidised treatment by health professionals such as doctors, specialists, optometrists
and in specific circumstances dentists and other allied health practitioners and accommodation as a public patient in a
public hospital (ii) 75 per cent of the Medicare Schedule fee for services and procedures if you are a private patient in a
public or private hospital (does not include hospital accommodation and items such as theatre fees and medicines) and
(iii) some health-care services in certain countries: Department of Human Services, ‘Australia’s health 2014’, http://www.
aihw.gov.au/australias-health/2014/health-system/
GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW, 2016
VOL. 25, NO. 1, 71–86
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2016.1203274
the federal government and the states and territories affirmed four main principles, the
fourth of which states that Australia’s health system should ‘provide all Australians
with timely access to quality health services based on their needs, not ability to pay, regard-
less of where they live in the country’. Furthermore, among the objects of the agreement is
the outcome that ‘Australians are born and remain healthy’.2 On the assumption then, that
equality of access to health care services is a key component of the Australian health care
system, it is worth examining to what extent, if any, genetic carrier screening that provides
individuals and couples with information about their risk of having a child with a genetic
condition constitutes ‘treatment’ to which Medicare-funded access ought properly to be
provided.
In this article, I assess the ethical and legal implications for a progressive and inclusive
approach towards people with disability, of providing publicly funded and universal
access to carrier testing and expanded carrier testing. In answering this question I
focus on two main concerns namely whether such access (1) involves a neoliberal indi-
vidualisation of risk and responsibility away from the State and (2) might impinge on the
reproductive and other rights of people with disability. With respect to this last question
I ask specifically is it possible to provide whole-population preconception genetic carrier
screening while legally guaranteeing the reproductive rights to conceive of prospective
parents, both women and men, who test positive as a carrier for an inheritable genetic
condition?
Standard genetic screening and the impact of new expanded carrier
testing?
Traditionally, genetic screening has been disease-based, concentrating on specific con-
ditions that are known to be prevalent in particular ethnic backgrounds and generally con-
ceded to be severely disabling or life-threatening. For example, screening programs for Tay
Sachs Disease (TSD) (a condition that progressively destroys nerve cells and results in
death in very early childhood) targeting Ashkenazi Jewish patients and similar programs
for Sickle Cell Disease (a group of conditions that involves a red blood cell disorder that
can result in severe pain and a shortened life span) targeting people of West African,
African-Caribbean, Indian, Arabic and Mediterranean origin have resulted in race- and
ethnicity-specific screening. While initially responding to the prevalence of a specific con-
dition, these population-based ethnicity-specific programs demonstrate a tendency to
rapidly expand to include additional conditions and tests. For example, in Australia,
although TSD screening began just targeting TSD in 15–17-year-old students attending
Jewish high schools in NSW in 1995 and in Melbourne in 1998,3 today those same popu-
lations are now targeted for genetic screening for a number of conditions that are
described as having an increased frequency in Jewish populations: cystic fibrosis (CF),
mucolipidosis-type VI, Fanconianaemia, familial dysautonomia, Canavan disease and
Bloom Syndrome.4
2Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘National Healthcare Agreement (2015)’, http://meteor.aihw.gov.au/content/
index.phtml/itemId/558998
3Lew et al (2015), p 20.
4Lew et al (2015), p 20. This upsizing has occurred where the DorYeshorim platform is used within orthodox communities in
other countries as well. Notably Israel and the USA: see Inthorn (2014).
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Migration and inter-marriage have ensured that ethnic-specific categories (if they ever
were reliable) have become less compelling as identifiers of potential disease inheritance.
The development of expanded carrier testing has led some to argue that the racialisation or
ethnicisation of risk should be replaced with a pan ethnic or universal approach to precon-
ception screening targeting multiple diseases and genetic conditions across populations.
This would avoid the concomitant risks of ethnic-specific testing that arise from inaccura-
cies of ancestral knowledge and an increasingly transglobal and multiethnic society. It
would also go some way to tackling the stigmatising social consequences of identifying
specific diseases with racial and ethnic minorities. For example, Maria Berghs et al
argue that, while originally screening programs for sickle cell were ‘socio-politically allied
to ideas of repair, in terms of the state improving the health of a neglected ethnic minority
population’,5 the assignation of Sickle cell as a ‘black disease’ led to carrier status being
used to discriminate. They go on to observe that ‘SCD is located within a system of stig-
matised signs (being “black”), collective memory of racialised medicine and “black” repro-
ductive politics predisposing it to a hermeneutics of suspicion.’6
While a pan ethnic or universal approach to preconception screening that targets mul-
tiple genetically based diseases would potentially overcome concerns over racialisation of
specific conditions, each condition tested raises different ethical issues that may be
obscured by broad spectrum screening. In order to understand the ethical debate it is help-
ful to focus first on one condition before looking at the question of an expanded panel of
conditions.
CF is the most common autosomal recessive disorder in the Caucasian population
generally7 and medical professional organisations hold inconsistent views on whether
screening for CF should be offered to all preconceptual and prenatal patients – not
just those identified as susceptible on the basis of ethnicity. In Australia, the Human
Genetics Society of Australasia (HSGA) recommends that ‘[a]ll couples intending to
have children, or who are pregnant, should be made aware of the availability of cystic
fibrosis carrier screening’.8 This recommendation is partly based on an assessment of
the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) and the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recommendations. Their 2011
guidelines recommend that screening for CF be offered to all preconceptual and prenatal
patients regardless of ethnic background on the basis that ‘[i]t is becoming increasingly
difficult to assign a single ethnicity to individuals’.9 In adopting a similar position the
HGSA reviewed the published data and found there was minimal evidence of adverse
psychosocial outcomes for women identified as carriers of CF in population-based
screening programs.10 They also recommend either Two-step screening or Expanded
one-step screening. In the case of the former, one member of the couple is tested first.
If they are found to be a carrier then the partner is tested. Notably, in their Position
Statement the HGSA states:
5Berghs et al (2015), p 11.
6Berghs et al (2015), p 11.
7Bajaj and Gross (2014), p 1034.
8Delatycki et al (2014), p 581.
9American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee on Genetics ACOG (2011), p 1030.
10Delatycki et al (2014), p 581.
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In this model one member of the couple (usually the female) is tested initially. If she is found
to be a carrier then her partner is tested… 11
Women, perhaps inadvertently, appear to bear the brunt of the testing burden. The HGSA
do indicate, however, that the preferred model is expanded one-step screening where both
members of the couple are tested at once and given access to their test results individually.
In Australia, CF is the most common genetically identifiable conditions affecting children
with European backgrounds and in 90 per cent of cases of children born with the con-
dition there is no existing family history.12
Should all Australians, regardless of ethnicity, contemplating having children be
offered, as a matter of equality of access to health services, publicly funded preconceptual
carrier testing for CF? First, the test for CF is only 84 per cent accurate, giving rise to a
small percentage of false reassurances. In any panel test the accuracy rate for different con-
ditions will vary. Secondly, CF presents with varying levels of severity so that a positive
genetic test is a fairly crude measure of risk. The relevant threshold of severity may be dif-
ficult to ascertain and consequently, it will be questionable whether it is a condition that
warrants screening or elimination.13 Presently, for people with no family history of CF, the
test is available only on a user pays basis in Australia and the HGSA notes that this is a
consideration when recommending ‘that all couples should be made aware of the avail-
ability of CF carrier screening… ’14 Publicly funded access, therefore, becomes a major
impediment to giving effect to this recommendation.
Publicly funded universal access to expanded carrier testing and the
testing burden
As already noted the availability of expanded carrier screening changes the ethical
debate around ‘universal’ screening of singular disorders by making it possible to
test for many conditions at one time. This inevitably raises concerns about what con-
stitutes a disability, who determines what conditions are included in panel tests and
when is it appropriate to offer such testing. Kumal Bajaj and Susan Gross note that
‘[e]xpanded panels have received criticism because some of the disorders selected
may not be clinically significant, have an overall low frequency or a variable onset
and clinical course’.15
The HSGA has not produced a position statement on expanded carrier testing but it is
useful to consider the statement provided by the ACMG, together with the ACOG, the
National Society of Genetic Counselors, the Perinatal Quality Foundation and the Society
for Maternal-Fetal Medicine. These groups have issued a joint statement regarding the
appropriate use of expanded carrier screening.16 Specifically, they note that ‘[e]xpanded
panels screen for conditions with a wide range of severity and age of onset and frequently
have carrier frequencies that are not known for all populations’17 and therefore the
11Delatycki et al (2014), p 580.
12Modra et al (2010).
13See Karpin and Savell (2012) for a discussion of the controversy surrounding notions of seriousness in testing.
14Delatycki et al (2014), p 583.
15Bajaj and Gross (2014).
16Edwards et al (2015).
17Edwards et al (2015), p 6.
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conditions screened for should be limited to conditions where one or more of the follow-
ing exist:
(1) Cognitive disability
(2) Need for surgical or medical intervention
(3) Effect on quality of life and
(4) conditions for which prenatal diagnosis might result in
(a) prenatal intervention to improve perinatal outcome and immediate care of the
neonate.
(b) delivery management to optimise newborn and infant outcomes such as immedi-
ate, specialised neonatal care.
(c) Prenatal education of parents regarding special needs care after birth: this often
may be accomplished most effectively before birth.18
However, the statement also suggests that it may be preferable not to screen for con-
ditions in which:
(1) the disorder is associated most often with an adult-onset phenotype and molecular
testing cannot distinguish between childhood or adult onset.
(2) variants have high allele frequencies and low penetrance of a phenotype.
(3) the most appropriate approach to screening is something other than molecular test-
ing, often because of low penetrance when molecular variants are identified.
In other words testing is not recommended for conditions which are highly unlikely or
where the disorder may only present in adulthood. While we have no Australian equival-
ent the HGSA has, however, indicated in its Position Statement on Population Based
Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibrosis that expanded carrier testing is already available as
direct to consumer testing and screens for several hundred mutations. It is noted there
that though initially a low cost high fidelity option, expanded carrier testing nevertheless
may result in greater costs over time because of the enlarged need for pre- and post-test
counselling and follow-up testing.19
Based on these various professional organisation statements, it seems clear that the key
ethical concern in expanded carrier screening is going to be which tests are included in the
panel. Although not referring directly to ‘seriousness’, the American Colleges joint state-
ment clearly recommends against testing for conditions that do not reach a threshold of
seriousness. But, there is nothing in the statement that acknowledges the level of disagree-
ment that exists among health practitioners and disability advocates over what conditions
it is appropriate to include in a test.20 It has been argued that making a test available for a
particular trait or condition works like a feedback loop, generating a conviction that the
trait or condition being tested is one for which testing is needed.21 However, if the con-
ditions included in the panel for testing are not seriously disabling or indeed their
18Edwards et al (2015).
19Delatycki et al (2014).
20For a small selection see: Asch (2003), Ettorre (2002) and Parens and Asch (2003).
21Lippman (1991) and Phelan et al (2013).
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classification is the subject of significant disagreement, the desire or ‘need’ to be tested is
based on a false assumption. Potential parents who view the mere inclusion of the con-
dition in the panel as a sign that it is sufficiently serious to warrant testing may feel com-
pelled by an unjustifiable testing imperative. While this may not justify a legal prohibition
on testing for these conditions, it may provide an ethical basis to exclude universal testing
for those conditions.
The American Colleges’ joint statement does, however, refer to the fact that testing for
late-onset conditions is not recommended. Apart from the fact that there is significant ethical
debate about whether prenatal including preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) (let alone
preconception) testing is appropriate for late-onset conditions22 which include genetic
mutations as varied as Huntington’s (with 100 per cent penetrance) and the Breast cancer
genes BRCA 1 and 2 (with 85 per cent penetrance) in the case of preconception carrier
screening the risk posed by universal testing is multiplied. Carrier testing is aimed to identify
mutations in recessive genes with no phenotypic expression in the relevant individual. How-
ever, it is possible that in some cases the person may himself or herself be found to have the
condition. In that case testing that initially aimed to identify carrier status may actually ident-
ify the presence of a late-onset condition, or a mild version of a condition about which the
person was otherwise unaware. This makes the HGSA remarks that any universal testing
scheme will need to be supported by comprehensive pre- and post-test counselling vital.
Thus when considering whether there is a case for public health provision of expanded
carrier testing, it is important to weigh in the balance any increase in the testing burden, and
the consequent possibility of stigma and discrimination that results from a positive test
result. A regulatory system which favoured universal and publicly funded expanded carrier
testing would be premised on a perceived assessment of risk and benefit to future possible
children. However, this approach has the potential to shift the focus away from the health
and well-being of existing persons, their privacy rights and their need for protection against
disability (or imputed disability) based discrimination.23 Instead it may create abstract
responsibilities towards those who do not yet exist and may never come to exist.24 Further-
more, as argued below, the testing burden tends to fall more heavily on women and this
raises additional ethical concerns about the way in which these tests have a gendered impact.
The individualisation of risk and responsibility for the welfare of future
children
The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians com-
mented on the availability of expanded carrier testing in its guidelines on Prenatal screen-
ing and diagnosis of chromosomal and genetic abnormalities in the fetus in pregnancy.
22The National Health and Medical Council Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproduction in Clinical Practice and Research
state in paragraph 12.2 that PGD should only be used for the prevention of conditions that seriously harm the person
to be born. There is an open question about whether late onset conditions such as breast cancer would fall within
that definition. Nevertheless there has been regulatory approval of PGD for BRCA in Victoria and WA and in NSW
clinics have interpreted the paragraph as inclusive of BRCA testing. See Karpin and Savell (2012).
23Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
24There has been significant philosophical debate about whether moral value can be attached to the action of avoiding the
birth of a child with a disability. In her book Scott (2007) at p 39 provides a critical discussion of the work of Derek Parfit
who has suggested that there is no harm where the alternative for a child who would be born with a disability is not to be
born. If that child never comes to exist, then there is no person affected by the decision. This is the non-person affecting
principle.
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Under the heading ‘Population-based preconceptional genetic screening’ it is noted that it
may be more economical to take the two-step approach to screening. In this case the
guidelines state: ‘test the female first and then only test the male partner should she be
found to be a carrier of the specific autosomal recessive condition(s) being screened
for’.25 Scant attention is paid to the way these economic efficiencies increase the testing
burden for women and its financial and psychological consequences.
As noted at the outset, recommendations that all couples should be made aware of the
availability of certain screening tests,26 where funding for and access to those tests is not
universally available, can result in unnecessary parental stress and anxiety if there is
inability to privately purchase those services. An approach that focuses on merely ensuring
awareness of the availability of a test has the effect of shifting the burden of responsibility
for future good health and well-being away from the State to individuals. Preconception
health and awareness programs developed by government health departments and
implemented by general practitioners, where unsupported by public funding and universal
access, simply entrench individuals in a system of self-surveillance.27 These individuals are
then charged with the task of eliminating or at the very least avoiding harmful risks posed
to future children. Abby Lippman has described this emphasis on individual risk manage-
ment as having the effect of converting the ‘at-risk’ category into a disease state while
framing ‘natural experiences as causes of future diseases’.28
One example of this kind of individualisation of risk can be seen in the work of bioethi-
cists Pieter Bonte et al documenting what they call the Preconception care (PCC) armoury.
They have collated this armoury from a number of sources, but principally the Health Coun-
cil of the Netherlands’s Preconception Care: a Good Beginning.29 The armoury consists of
nine obligations which the authors do not endorse in their entirety but describe as offering
an idea of ‘the demands a fully-fledged PCC regime would put on potential parents’.30 Obli-
gations 5, 6 and 8 on the list represent particularly notable instances of neoliberal burden
shifting away from the State to the individual and I will address obligations 5 and 6
below and obligation 8 under the heading ‘Universal screening and the impact on the repro-
ductive rights of people with disability and people who test positive for carrier status’ below.
Obligation 5 suggests that individuals should take care to avoid environmental toxins.
Undertaking work with particular kinds of hazardous chemicals is clearly ill advised prior
to conceiving for both men and women and when a woman is pregnant.31 However, even
25Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Gynaecologists and Human Genetics Society of Australasia (2015), p 14.
26Delatycki et al (2014), p 583.
27For a detailed discussion of different government preconception health care initiatives see: Karpin (2010).
28Lippman (2006).
29Health Council of the Netherlands (2007).
30Bonte et al (2014). The list includes: (1) follow a number of specific dietary prescriptions; (2) take specific supplements; (3)
avoid obesity and anorexia; (4) moderate or abstain from use of alcohol, tobacco and various other recreational drugs; (5)
avoid specific environmental exposures and chemicals; (6) avoid excessive psychological stress; (7) take specific precau-
tionary measures in case of maternal health problems or when taking medication prior to conception; (8) avoid consan-
guinity and (in case of suspected risk) undergo genetic screening and if necessary, take appropriate measures, such as
using assisted reproduction techniques, choosing a different reproductive partner, or abstaining from reproduction; and
(9) last but not least time conception at an ‘optimal age’ via contraception and other means of family planning.
31Indeed in the now well-known 1991 case of United Auto Workers v Johnson Controls US 111 S Ct 1196 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court found that Johnson Controls attempts to stop fertile women working in jobs involving exposure to
high levels of lead were in contravention of the anti-discrimination provisions in Title VI. One of the reasons this was
found to be discriminatory was that it could not be shown that men were not also similarly affected. Women fought
for the right to be exposed because these were some of the best paying jobs and ones with real promotional
opportunities.
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if it were possible to avoid work involving exposure to high levels of toxins, simply placing
the burden of avoiding environmental exposures on the individual woman who may
become pregnant is misguided. Toxins that may impact yet-to-be-born children exist in
homes as well as workplaces and the broader environment. It is simply not feasible, as
an individual, to purify one’s environment of all potential toxicity. Alana Cattapan et al
predict that this kind of burden shifting will mean:
Women who fail to avoid cosmetics laden with phthalates, or who buy a used sofa leaching
flame retardants, may one day be seen as negligent by failing to avoid known toxic
substances…32
Obligation 6 of the PCC armoury list urges us to avoid excessive psychological stress.
Arguably, this is more absurd than avoiding ubiquitous chemical toxins. It is tempting
to think that with the appropriate combination of therapy, anti-depressants and exercise
the individual can manage themselves into a state of well-being. However, even if we were
able to control our own levels of stress, recent research in the field of epigenetics suggests
stress and trauma may have already left its intergenerational mark on our children’s future
well-being in the generation of our children’s grandparents.33 The mechanism for trans-
mission is not DNA mutations – for which we might screen – but rather occurs through
the regulation of gene expression, that is, epigenetically.
If we decide to provide universal publicly funded genetic testing the testing burden
created by expanded carrier screening must be weighed against other public health initiat-
ives that might be activated to avoid future harm. Miranda Waggoner and Tobias Uller
describe epigenetics as ‘the study of how environmental exposures (including those
internal to the organism) alter gene activity without changing the genetic makeup of
the individual’.34 The most commonly discussed epigenetic mechanism is DNA methyl-
ation, which has as one of its functions modification of gene expression.35 Exposure to
environmental stress or trauma in one generation may, it is claimed, cause a gene to
turn on or turn off in the next generation or even across several generations. These are
heritable changes in gene expression – rather than changes to the gene or DNA itself.
What is interesting about this new research is that it suggests that genetic testing may
be ineffective. Instead disparities in health that appear across generations may derive
from environmental and social forces. Bridget Goosby and Chelsea Heidbring for instance
argue that:
The health consequences of racism and discrimination can be persistent and passed from one
generation to the next through the body’s ‘biological memory’ of harmful experiences.36
The expectation of individual action via expanded carrier testing to avoid what are
claimed to be harmful reproductive outcomes (and I will return to the question of what
constitutes a harm below) thus bumps up against the problem that genes do not determine
health and well-being and that health and well-being are not uncontroversial normative
standards.
32Cattapan et al (2015), p 110.
33Warin et al (2015), Meloni (2015), Landecker and Panofsky (2013), Sullivan (2013), Geronimus (2013), Rutter (2012) and
Rothstein et al (2009).
34Waggoner and Uller (2015), p 177.
35Waggoner and Uller (2015), p 179.
36Goosby and Heidbring (2013).
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What constitutes a normatively undesirable genetic profile and the ethical
implications for a progressive and inclusive approach to people with
disability?
As indicated above, expanded carrier testing raises real questions about how we concep-
tualise the normal genome and a healthy future. According to Sara Wienke et al, ‘[i]t is
estimated that each individual is a carrier of between zero and seven severe childhood
recessive conditions with an average of 2.8 found in one study’.37 This has led authors
such as Michelle McGowan et al to suggest that ‘[t]he inclusion of more disease risks in
[carrier screening] panels brings with it the increased possibility that more pregnant
women will receive positive results, potentially making identification as a carrier “the
new normal”’.38 Therefore, it is no small concession to require – as the ACOG and
ACMG Joint Statement does – that screening be restricted to variants ‘with the highest
likelihood of being pathogenic’.39
That being the case, it is clear that a careful approach must be adopted to any move
towards universal publicly funded carrier screening. It must be tempered by a well-defined
understanding of how variants are identified as sufficiently severe to warrant avoidance
strategies, and who is placed to decide. With an expanding array of testing capabilities,
it becomes increasingly difficult to determine whether the test proposed will identify a
variation that is scientifically insignificant, or a variation that results in the birth of
child with a severe disability.
Disability is both a broad term and a controversial one. In the context of preconception
genetic testing, and universal publicly funded access thereto, the question of what kinds of
differences might make up the category of normatively undesirable disability should form
a large component of the discussion. This requires a deep attention to critical disability
studies critiques that challenge presumptive appeals to the self-evidence of a harmful out-
come. Jackie Leach Scully sums it up well when she says that ‘an all-embracing category of
“disability”… homogenizes the enormous range of manifestations and aetiologies of dis-
ability… ’40 In the preconception context where the risk of passing on a genetic anomaly is
seen as a key concern, there is, as Scully goes on to note, a tendency ‘especially in the pop-
ular media, to support a vastly oversimplified picture in which all genotypic or phenotypic
variation is an adverse deviation from the norm’.41 As stated at the outset what constitutes
the norm is determined by the social as well as scientific context and may rely on unstated
assumptions about what it is to be healthy. Feminist and critical race studies critiques
show, for example, how the idea of ‘health’ itself may be gendered and raced.42 For
example, recent work examining the higher incidence of autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) in boys has revealed that this may be due to a gender bias in the diagnosis and
characterisation of the disorder.43 Importantly, although there is no genetic marker for
ASD, there has been considerable research effort and money invested in trying to identify
37Wienke et al (2014), p 191.
38McGowan et al (2013), p 9.
39Edwards et al (2015), p 7.
40Scully (2008), p 800.
41Scully (2008), p 800.
42Tang et al (2008), Gough (2006), Johnson et al (2004), Tolman et al (2003) and Courtenay (2000).
43Constantino and Charman (2012), Gillis-Buck and Richardson (2014), Goldman (2013) and Bombaci (2012), p 144.
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one.44 Yet clearly a condition that exists along a spectrum and that has, as one of its dis-
tinguishing characteristics, ‘deficits in social communication’,45 requires a complex and
nuanced approach to disability that recognises it is both created out of as well as in its
social context. It is clear then that any policy aimed at providing universal and publicly
funded access to genetic screening must also entrench a nuanced and complex approach
to disability that protects individuals from discrimination who may not share normative
views about whether a particular disability is so undesirable as to warrant genetic screen-
ing. Kyle Anstey argues, for instance, that traits associated with disability ‘demand exam-
ination in the varied context of both parental lifeplans and personal and socio-
environmental barriers to, and facilitators of, functioning’.46
What constitutes a genetic abnormality for which screening or testing is warranted is
laden with contextually driven values and ideas about what it is to be healthy and well.
Indeed as I have argued elsewhere (with Karen O’Connell) ‘[d]isability itself is a contro-
versial idea and inflected and distorted by associated levels of stigmatisation’.47
Nevertheless, arguably the availability and accessibility of preconception genetic carrier
screening is something that can be controlled and offered equitably. A number of pro-
fessional bodies and public health organisations have gone so far as to recommend
whole-population carrier screening for preconception purposes as a matter of health
equity.48 However, as has just been shown what counts as a screenable genetic anomaly
cannot simply be aligned with a negative phenotypic outcome. The meaning to be derived
from the existence of a specific gene will vary depending on the context and views in that
context about what constitutes a disability.
Universal screening and the impact on the reproductive rights of people
with disability and people who test positive for carrier status
Obligation 8 on Bonte et al’s PCC armoury list, which, amongst other things, suggests that
prospective parents ‘undergo genetic screening and if necessary, take appropriate
measures such as using assisted reproduction techniques, choosing a different reproduc-
tive partner, or abstaining from reproduction’49 indicates a clear expectation that prospec-
tive parents will access preconception screening. There is a growing expectation in places
like Australia and other developed nations that potential parents engage in some level of
preconception genetic self-surveillance. Bonte et al suggest that:
A normal and reasonably prudent prospective parent…who has good reason to assume that
he/she belongs to a group with an elevated genetic risk of severely afflicting future offspring,
would be acting morally irresponsibly if he/she knowingly foregoes genetic carrier
screening.50
Given that it is unlikely a person will have ‘good reason to assume’ they belong to an at-
risk group unless they themselves or someone closely related has a disability, the
44Yuen et al (2015), Herbert et al (2006) and Risch et al (1999).
45Autism Speaks (date unknown).
46Anstey (2008), p 246.
47Karpin and O’Connell (2015).
48Human Genetics Commission UK (2011).
49Bonte et al (2014).
50Bonte et al (2014).
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admonition against morally irresponsible behaviour immediately singles out prospective
parents who themselves have a serious inheritable condition or who are closely related
to someone who does. However, there is no consensus about what constitutes a serious
disability. While it might be possible to identify a gene with a particular phenotypic out-
come, the significance of the phenotype depends in large measure on the social context in
which the individual will be living. Disabilities that manifest in challenging behaviour are a
perfect example of this. Research that is currently being undertaken to identify the genetic
origins of traits such as aggression, lack of empathy and anti-social behaviour51 relies on a
shared consensus about what is pro-social behaviour. As I have argued elsewhere (with
O’Connell) ‘[t]his means that the type of society in which one is born, or the type of public
sphere one wants to inhabit, determines whether a person will be diagnosed with a medical
“disorder” associated with challenging behaviour’.52 If we perceive disability simply as a
medical condition then the idea of repair is limited to medical care of the individual
whether that be through genetic testing technologies or gene therapy or whatever else is
on the horizon. However, if we understand disability as constituted by the social context,
amongst other things, then our responses will be contingent on what kind of disability/
ability is valued in that context. Indeed, it has been established through the work of
Sol Levine, Gary Albrecht and others, that the concept of disability and its various
qualifiers – serious, severe, life threatening – requires interpretation in a social context.
These authors have found that a disability paradox exists whereby those who have what
are understood to be disabling traits view their quality of life in far more positive terms
than those who do not.53 This includes not just the public generally but also health care
workers who might be thought to have a more complex understanding. Furthermore,
while an individual may have a genetic condition that has a variable presentation from
mild to severe, under Bonte et al’s prudential thinking, such a person would be expected
to test to exclude their condition just in case their offspring are born with a more severe
version. In other words, while this statement reads rather neutrally – directed at all people
of varying ability and both men and women – in fact it has a much greater impact on
members of a narrow population who it implies do not have the right to view their repro-
ductive life plans normatively. Instead they must view them with suspicion and take risk
avoidance strategies if they are to be viewed as moral beings.
Conclusion: What would universal publicly funded equality of access to
expanded carrier screening entail?
At the present time, unlike PGD, in Australia and across the State jurisdictions there is very
little formal legislative control of preconception genetic testing or expanded carrier testing.
Most regulation occurs in the formof professional guidelines and government health depart-
ment policy documents. Genetic information, with its capacity to reveal the health status of
both individuals and their kin, as well as being predictive of potential future health develop-
ments, makes people vulnerable to discrimination. Were expanded carrier testing to be
made universally accessible and publicly funded, it would need to be coupled with protective
51Elev et al (2003), Beaver et al (2008) and Viding et al (2005).
52Karpin and O’Connell (2015).
53See, for example, Albrecht and Devlieger (1999) and Levine (1987).
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legislation. Even if it were carefully regulated so that it was limited to an agreed set of con-
ditions that required a threshold of severity, penetrance and age of onset, people who
were revealed to carry genetic anomalies would need to be protected from discrimination.
They would need to be protected from discrimination on the basis of their genetic status
(in access to insurance, employment, education and other goods and services) but, perhaps
more importantly, in terms of their right to reproduce unmolested by a genetic testing
imperative.
It is important that if we move towards making genetic screening universally accessible
and publicly funded we do not, at the same time, preclude individuals who test positive as
carriers fromreproducing using their owngeneticmaterial if they sowish.Aswehave already
seen, some forms of genetic testingmay be activated along racial lines and, in the case of tests
that reveal the presence of genes such as BRCA1 and BRCA2 (the so-called breast cancer
gene) there is a significant potential for a gendered approach to testing as well.54 This kind
of intersectional dimension must also be addressed in any access and protection regime.
Genetic discrimination is already indirectly covered by Australia’s federal and state sys-
tems of anti-discrimination laws, primarily by the Disability Discrimination Act 1992
(Cth) (DDA). The DDA applies to disabilities ‘imputed to a person’ in s 4 and was
amended in 2009, so that it also applies to disabilities that may exist in the future ‘includ-
ing because of a genetic predisposition to that disability’. This protection from discrimi-
nation applies to education, employment and goods and services. There are some
examples of genetic discrimination complaints in Australia such as denial of life insurance
due to the presence of the MSH6 gene, which increases susceptibility for colon cancer;55
however, there have not yet been any reported court cases on genetic discrimination in
Australia.56 Because of this it is difficult to know whether discrimination on the grounds
of carrier status would be caught by this definition. Carrier status might be described quite
differently since the person is not themselves disabled, will not become disabled in the
future and the disability is not imputed to them but rather to their future children. It is
quite possible, however, that people will be stopped or at least discouraged and counseled
against using their own gametes in this situation. In these circumstances they are not
exactly being discriminated against on the grounds of their own disability unless carrier
status itself can be characterised as a disability, raising further concerns.
In other jurisdictions, genetic discrimination is regulated more directly. In the United
States, the Genetic Information Non Discrimination Act (GINA) makes genetic discrimi-
nation unlawful in insurance and education.57 Genetic information in this context
includes an individual’s predisposition towards a condition, but more importantly for
the preconception context, it extends to include a prohibition on the use of family health
history.58 While the same limit extends to employers it does not, however, include life
insurance or access to goods and services generally. This means that this provision will
54It should be noted that the proposal by the ACOG Joint Statement that age of onset would be a factor to be considered in
any testing protocol might mean that BRCA 1 and 2 would not be included in universal panel testing. Notably, however,
PGD is available in Australia to test for the presence of these breast cancer genes in embryos. See, for example, the
website of IVF Australia which boasts PGD for BRCA1 and 2, http://ivf.com.au/fertility-treatment/genetic-testing-
pgd#what-single-gene-disorders-can-pgd-test-for-.
55Keogh and Otlowski (2013).
56In the US, see Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v Sheila White 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
57Genetic Information and Non Discrimination Act (GINA) Pub.L. No, 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
58GINA s 102(a).
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not protect individuals’ denied access to Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) ser-
vices on the basis of their carrier status. In that case they would need to rely on other pro-
tections such as those that exist under the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA).
The definition of disability found in the ADA would capture individuals’ refused access
to ART due to a disability; however, it is not clear that carrier status would be captured.
On top of this there is significant case law showing that many prospective parents who
have an existing disability are denied access to these services in flagrant disregard for
the Act.59 In the UK, genetic discrimination has not been directly prohibited and there
is concern raised that new expanded carrier testing will ‘provide a platform for genetic
testing to be used for novel and unpredicted purposes’.60 There was a suggestion that
the UK Equality Act 2012 be extended to cover genetic discrimination; however, that
has not happened. Furthermore, the definition of disability in the Equality Act 2012 is
even more circumscribed than in either the DDA or the ADA. Thus again a question arises
about whether it extends to cover someone who is not disabled but is a carrier of a
condition.
Comprehensive regulations outlawing genetic discrimination in access to ART services,
amongst other things, may therefore be a necessary first step in the development of a man-
ageable regime of publicly funded universal and expanded carrier testing. However, even
in the presence of protective legislation, subtle forms of pressure can be applied to discou-
rage people who test positive from reproducing without utilising disability avoidance strat-
egies. Any move towards equal access to publicly funded universal preconception genetic
testing must include a careful strategy for ensuring that ideas of normalcy and disability
are always up for discussion and for ensuring that those individuals who choose to repro-
duce using their own gametes despite the presence of a genetic ‘abnormality’ continue to
be able to do so in the same way as people who do not have such a condition.
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